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This paper shows that the Japanese and Swiss foreign exchange interventions in 2003/04 
and 2009/10 seem to have lowered long-term interest rates in a range of industrial countries, 
including Japan and Switzerland. It seems that this decline was triggered by the investment 
of the intervention funds in US and euro area bonds and that a global portfolio balance effect 
made this decline in interest rate spread to other markets, thus easing monetary conditions 
at home and abroad. 
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1.  Introduction 
Policy developments can require a rethinking of long-held propositions about policy. So it is 
with the effects of foreign exchange interventions, changes in official reserve management 
practices and large scale asset purchases.  
These require us to rethink the proposition dating back to Joan Robinson’s 1937 essay that 
currency depreciation (or resisting currency appreciation) is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. 
This phrase condemns currency depreciation in a world of insufficient effective demand as a 
case of robbing the foreign Peter to pay the domestic Paul: cheaper exports of the home 
country increase output and employment at the expense of sales and jobs in competing 
countries. 
However,  policy  developments  mean  that  this  analysis  has  become  incomplete  and 
misleading. Foreign exchange reserve management has shifted its investment focus from 
gold in the 1930s and Treasury bills in the 1950s to bonds today. We argue in this paper that 
as  a  result  currency  intervention  today  bears  similarities  to  the  large-scale  asset  (bond) 
purchases (LSAPs) that have recently become a popular unconventional monetary policy 
tool. 
LSAPs  targeted  at  bonds  can  ease  monetary  conditions  through  either  market  liquidity 
effects or portfolio balance effects. In the latter case, if market participants that have sold 
bonds  to  the  central  bank  purchase  substitutes  (or  are  expected  to  do  so),  bond  prices 
broadly  go  up  and  yields  down (see  e.g.  Bernanke  and  Reinhart  (2004),  Bernanke  et  al 
(2004), Sack (2009) and Bernanke (2010)). This portfolio rebalancing can stimulate interest-
sensitive investment and raise asset prices, inducing wealth effects.
1 Indeed, Neely (2010) 
documents a drop in international bond yields in response to LSAPs, suggesting a global 
portfolio balance effect. 
To our knowledge, there is only one paper that examines the impact of interventions on the 
government bond yields of the target currency. Bernanke et al (2004) establish that US 
government  bond  yields  declined  during  the  period  of  Japanese  foreign  exchange 
intervention in 2003-04.
2 They argue that this happened because the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) invested the freshly purchased US dollars in US government bonds.  
We add to their analysis in two ways. First, we establish that the same intervention also 
caused a decline in other long -term interest rates. In particular, ten -year government bond 
yields in other industrialised countries declined, as did ten-year interest rate swap rates in a 
variety of currencies. This suggests a broadly based portfolio balance effect driven by close 
substitutability of similar bonds for the particular bonds pur chased. Indeed, even Japanese 
interest rates seem to have decreased in response to the interventions. Second, we show 
that the same effects seem to have been at work during the Swiss currency intervention in 
2009-10. 
Our main conclusions is that a “beggar-thy-neighbour” charge, which concentrates on trade 
effects,  overlooks  the  monetary  easing  caused  by  the  investment  of  the  proceeds  of 
intervention  both abroad  and  at  home. In  times  when  policymakers  of  different  countries 
simultaneously attempt to loosen monetary conditions, this may be a welcome mechanism. 
                                                 
1   This portfolio balance effect should work also at a policy rate well above the zero lower bound. See the 
argument over the “bills only” doctrine within the Federal Reserve in the 1950s in Ritter (1980). 
2   Also related to our paper are Warnock and Warnock (2009) in their international perspective. They show that a 
broad range of US interest rates declines when foreigners purchase US government bonds. Restricted 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a short macroeconomic 
backdrop  to  the  interventions  and  the  actual  data  we  have.  These  are  especially  worth 
discussing in the Swiss case since no official intervention series is available. We then turn to 
the regressions that identify the impact of interventions on foreign and domestic government 
bonds yields and interest rate swap rates. The last section concludes. 
2.  Macroeconomic background and data 
2.1  Japan 
Japanese  property  prices  began  collapsing  in  1991,  and  the  economy  has  since  been 
marked by low growth and phases of moderate deflation. The Bank of Japan cut interest 
rates to close to zero in 1999 and adopted quantitative easing in 2001. In January 2003, the 
MoF began to intervene in the foreign exchange market to counter an appreciation of the yen 
against the US dollar that had begun a year before. Its entry into the market was quiet – 
“stealth interventions” as market participants later dubbed them. Initially, market participants 
were left to infer the interventions from the monthly disclosure of a Bank of Japan account 
linked to currency operations (Ito, 2005, p 224). On 8 May 2003, the MoF published daily 
data for the first calendar quarter that showed the full extent of its dollar-buying. 
Graph 1 shows the intervention data together with the JPY/USD exchange rate. The MoF 
managed to hold the yen roughly stable mostly in the 117-120 range against the US dollar 
until August 2003.
3 However, the exchange rate came under increasing upward pressure as 





Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance; national data. 
 
Moreover, the G7 called for more exchange-rate flexibility in September 2003, adding to the 
pressure for the yen to appreciate. On 16 March 2004, at an exchange rate of 106, the MoF 
                                                 
3  There is a large number of papers studying whether the interventions successfully influenced the exchange 
rate. See Fatum (2010), Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2005 and 2006), Ito (2003, 2004 and 2005), Ito and 
Yabu (2007) and Sarno and Taylor (2002) for the Japanese case and Neely (2005) for a general discussion. Restricted 
Name of publication  5 
 
 
quietly stopped intervening. By then, it had acquired JPY 35 trillion (USD 340 billion) over the 
fifteen months of intervention. This amounted to roughly 7% of Japanese GDP. 
2.2  Switzerland 
The global financial crisis hit Switzerland after years of moderate growth and price stability. 
Real  GDP  contracted, and  prices  seemed  set to fall. The  Swiss franc,  in  the meantime, 
appreciated, owing to a flight to safety and to the repayment of Swiss franc liabilities funding 
carry trades in high yielding currencies.
4 At its quarterly policy decision on 12 March 2009, 
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced that it intended to buy foreign exchange to 
prevent the Swiss franc from “any” further appreciation (SNB, 2009).
5 
This decision surprised market participants, notwithstanding an earlier warning of Hildebrand 
(2009). The Swiss franc jumped from 1.48 against the euro to 1.52, i.e. by more than 3 
percentage points. The Swiss franc had not depreciated by this extent on a single day since 
October 1978, when the SNB announced that its intention to keep the Deutsche mark 
exchange rate at a level above 0.8 Swiss francs. Apparently, the SNB purchased mainly 
euros but also US dollars (Garnham, 2009). 
At the end of 2009, it appeared that the balance of risk s had shifted and deflation had 
become a more  remote threat.  As  a consequence, the  SNB  changed its  language  to 
preventing “substantial” appreciation. Graph 2 shows that the Swiss franc began appreciating 
and that this trend became stronger when sovereign debt strains in the euro area intensified 
in April 2011. To counteract this in April to mid-June 2010, the SNB intervened at a rate of 
more than CHF 30 billion a month. On 17 June 2010, the SNB announced that the deflation 
risk had largely disappeared and ceased intervening. By then, the SNB had purchased an 
equivalent of USD 179 billion of euros and US dollars, amounting to 33% of Swiss GDP.  
Swiss data on intervention are sparse. The SNB publishes a monthly balance sheet, and 
from  this  monthly  intervention  amounts  can  be  inferred.  Since  the  SNB  discloses  the 
currency  composition  of  its  foreign  exchange  reserves,  we  can  adjust  for  exchange  rate 
changes.  That  leaves  investment  returns  (coupon  receipts  and  bond  valuation  changes) 
included  with  intervention  amounts  in  monthly  changes  in  reserves,  plotted  as  bars  in 
Graph 2. 
 
                                                 
4   See Brown et al (2009) and McCauley (2010) on Swiss franc-denominated household mortgages in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
5   The SNB also cut the policy rate, offered new long -term repos and announced the purchase Swiss franc 
bonds issued by domestic companies. Restricted 




The SNB’s interventions 
 
Sources: Swiss National Bank; national data, authors’ calculations. 
 
Graph 3 
Inferred intervention days 
 
Source: Various newspapers and wire services; UBS. 
 
For more granular data, we turn to market  participants and the financial press. Graph 3 
shows the intervention dates as identified by a press search and by UBS.
6 Close inspection 
shows that there are only five days when the press and UBS agree that there was an 
intervention. Below we use both series. It seems plausible that UBS, as a dealer on the EBS 
trading platform, on which the SNB traded extensively, had a better fix on interventions than 
the press. We code these inferred intervention days using dummy variables that take the 
value of unity on  the days that the SNB was reported to have purchased foreign exchange 
and zero otherwise. We are unable to assess intervention amounts on a daily basis. 
                                                 
6   We thank Giovanni Staunovo for sharing the UBS data with us. For the press dummy, we searched for articles 
mentioning intervention using LexisNexis and Factiva in the English, French and German press and then 
concentrated on the news that referred to individual purchases. Fischer (2004) reports that Reuters news 
reports in the period 1989 to 1995 correctly identified SNB intervention days on 63 out of 69 occasions. There 
was no case of false reporting. See also Chang (2004). Restricted 
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3.  Global  monetary  easing  effects  of  the  foreign  exchange 
  intervention 
In this section we test whether the interventions lowered bond yields abroad and at home. 
We expect to find a direct effect for the currencies against which the interventions took place, 
i.e. the US dollar and the euro. If investors rebalanced their portfolios, or if market makers 
anticipated their doing so, we would also expect bond yields in other currencies, including the 
home currency, to decline. 
For Japan, we follow the approach of Bernanke et al (2004) and regress the change in the 
ten-year US government bond yield on the intervention amount of the MoF. To account for 
the  time  that  passes  between  the  striking  of  the  foreign  exchange  deal  and  its  actual 
settlement and possible investment, Bernanke et al consider the change in yield from the day 
before  the  deal  until  two  days  after.
7 In contrast to them we consider not only the US 
government bond yield, but also that of Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland and Japan. Moreover, we estimate all equations using ten -year interest rate 
swap rates, which are yields from g eneric private-sector derivative contracts that are close 
substitutes to government bonds. With them, we can assess whether the rebalancing of 
portfolios is concentrated on government bonds or exerts broader effects on private yields. 
We thus fit 
         t t t t e tervention in a c i i       * 1 2                          (1) 
where we measure the foreign exchange interventions in trillion yen. The sample period is 15 
January 2003 to 16 March 2004. We also estimate 
       t t t t e dummy a c i i       * 1 2              (2) 
where  t dummy  is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity on intervention days and 
zero  otherwise.  While  equation  (1)  estimates  the  impact  of  an  additional  trillion  yen 
intervention  on  bond  yields,  equation  (2)  estimates  the  impact  of  the  average  daily 
intervention.
8 We present this regression for comparison with the Swiss case, for which we 
have only a dummy variable for reported intervention days but daily data on the actual 
amount of intervention.  
As a robustness check, we also estimate: 
     t t t t t t e vix vix b tervention in a c i i           ) ( * * 1 2 1 2                     (3) 
and 
       t t t t t t e vix vix b dummy a c i i           ) ( * * 1 2 1 2              (4) 
 
These equations allow for changes in global risk aversion, as measured by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange market volatility indicator VIX, to affect bond yields.
9,10  
                                                 
7   We also ran regressions using  1 1    t t i i . The impact of the intervention is significant in this setup, too. 
8   One could also interpret the dummy as a poor measure of the actual intervention size. By the usual errors -in-
variable argument, the coefficient estimate of a then would be biased downward and imprecise. Indeed, we 
find that the estimate of this coefficient tends to be smaller in equation (2) than in equation (1). 
9   The results are also robust to using only the percentage change in the VIX between t-1 and t. Restricted 
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For  Switzerland,  we  fit  equation  (2),  using  both  the  press  and  the  UBS  dummy  for 
interventions, over the period 12 March 2009 to 15 June 2010. We also estimate 




t t t t t t e CDS CDS f vix vix b dummy a c i i               ) ( * ) ( * * 1 2 1 2 1 2        (5) 
to control for the effect of flight to safety during the   European sovereign debt crisis on 
government  bond  yields.  We  measure  changes  in  market  participants’  sovereign  debt 
concerns as the change in the Greek sovereign CDS spread.  
Table 1 shows the estimation results using ten-year government bond yields. Table 2 shows 
the  results  using  ten-year  interest  rate  swap  rates  instead.  Generally,  we  find  that 
interventions drive down bond yields and swap rates abroad and at home. This is compatible 
with a broadly based global portfolio balance effect resulting from the authorities’ purchase of 
foreign government bonds. Foreign exchange interventions thus seem to loosen monetary 
conditions  abroad  and  at  home,  and  thus  should  not  be  seen  as  only  beggaring-thy-
neighbour. 
We  next  look  at  the  results  in  more  detail.  For  Japan,  where  we  can  use  the  actual 
intervention  amounts,  the  response  of  US  government  bonds  –  which  the  MoF  mainly 
purchased  –  clearly is strongest. The effect seems to have been transmitted, albeit to a 
smaller extent, to the other government bond markets. For Switzerland, we find responses 
around the world as well, with the strongest reaction again in US yields.
11   
Regarding the size of the intervention effect, it seems that one trillion yen of intervention 
lowered the US bond yield by 9.3 basis points in equation (1). This translates to an impact of 
roughly one basis point for a USD 1 billion intervention.
12 If we control for the impact of risk 
aversion (equation 3), the intervention amount continues to be significant with an estimated 
impact of 8.9 basis po ints per trillion. The estimated drop in the other bond yields ranges 
from 4.4 to 7.8 basis points, where the lowest value is for Japanese government bonds.
13 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
10   Increased risk aversion often raises the demand for safe haven assets, driving up the value of safe havens 
like the yen and the Swiss franc and thus raising the probability of an intervention. Modelling these relations as 
a system involves estimating OLS and binary regressions jointly and goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
11   Market participants also contemporaneously reported an impact. Lack and Staunovo (2010) argue that SNB 
purchases of German government bonds in April and May 2010 contributed to a sharp drop in bund yields. 
12   Bernanke et al report an effect of 0.73 basis points. If we focus on the impact of interventions on bond yields 
the next day, we find a smaller effect that is only border -line significant. Thus, perceived intervention, as 
distinct from the subsequent investment of the proceeds, does not  seem to be the whole story. Compare 
Gagnon et al, who find a 38-82 basis point effect from $1.7 trillion of bond purchases. 
13   Given that the cumulated intervention reached ¥35 trillion, this estimated impact suggests that the Japanese 
intervention lowered Japanese bond yields by some 1.6 percentage points, which would imply a negative 10 -
year bond yield Of course, the yield stayed positive. One explanation for this is that the intervention effect  
wore off over time. Restricted 
Name of publication  9 
 
 
Impact of interventions on ten-year government bond yields (in %)
1 
Japanese interventions 




























































































































































































































































2  0.017  0.154  0.014  0.262  0.018  0.161  0.002  0.298  0.007  0.068  0.017  0.162  0.010  0.045 
1 OLS regressions of equations (1) to (5), Japanese sample 15 January 2003 to 16 March 2004, Swiss sample 12 March 2009 to 15 June 2010. Constant included but not reported. CDS spread expressed in 
percentage points. Stars indicate significance at the ten percent level. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: BIS, MoF and SNB.    Table 1 
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Impact of intervention on ten-year interest rate swap rates (in %)
1 
Japanese interventions 






















































































































































































2  0.011  0.126  0.005  0.192  0.011  0.128  0.013  -0.212  0.013  0.085 
1 OLS regressions of equations (1) to (5), Japanese sample 15 January 2003 to 16 March 2004, Swiss sample 12 March 2009 to 15 June 2010. Constant included but not reported. CDS spread expressed in 
percentage points. Stars indicate significance at the ten percent level. White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Sources: BIS, MoF and SNB.    Table 2 Restricted 
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The Japanese regressions suggest that using a dummy for the intervention instead of the 
intervention  amount  decreases  the significance of  the estimated coefficients considerably 
and often yields insignificant estimates. Regarding the size of the estimated coefficients, the 
results reported in Table 1 for the intervention dummy suggest that the average Japanese 
intervention decreased ten-year US government bond yields by 2.4 basis points. 
Thus, the fact that  we often  do find  a  significant  impact  of  the  intervention  dummies for 
Switzerland points to a distinct effect of the SNB’s actions. It seems that the UBS dummy has 
higher explanatory power than the press dummy, which is perhaps not surprising given that 
UBS observed the SNB’s offers on the EBS trading platform. If we interpret the dummies as 
measuring the impact of the average intervention, we find for Switzerland that the effect 
ranges between 0.2 and 5.6 basis points for the UBS dummy. 
For interest rate swap, we estimate response coefficients between 4.1 and 9.8 basis points 
for Japan and between 1.0 and 5.2 basis points for Switzerland., These estimates lie in the 
range obtained for government bond yields and thus suggest a wide portfolio balance effect 
that  reaches  private  sector  yields  and  thereby  affects  the  cost  of  debt  for  firms  and 
households.  
One last noteworthy observation is that Spanish bond yields seem to have responded to the 
Japanese,  but  not  to  the  Swiss  interventions.  This  could  be  interpreted  to  suggest  that 
investors had ceased in the interval between the calm years of 2003-04 and the stressed 
years of 2009-10 to view Spanish bonds as close substitutes for those core euro area bonds 
that the SNB presumably purchased. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper shows that the Japanese and Swiss foreign exchange interventions in 2003/04 
and 2009/10 seem to have lowered long-term interest rates – both government bond yields 
and  interest  rate  swap  rates  –  in  a  range  of  industrial  countries,  including  Japan  and 
Switzerland. It seems that this decline was triggered by the investment of the intervention 
funds in US and euro area bonds and that the portfolio balance effect made this decline in 
interest rate spread to other markets. 
These  findings  afford  a  new  perspective  on  what  has  been  called  the  currency  wars.  It 
seems that the Japanese and Swiss interventions helped ease monetary conditions at home 
as well as abroad. Certainly in 2009/10 this international effect would have been welcome.  Restricted 
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